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DE NOVO BANKS: VIABLE BUSINESS MODEL OR 
QUAINT RELIC FROM THE PAST? 
RAY GRACE* 
I. INTRODUCTION
In his remarks to the Banking Institute seminar in Charlotte in 
March 2015, Tony Gaeta, an icon among banking counsel and a long-
time friend, gave what sounded disturbingly like the Last Rites to de novo 
banking.  I say disturbingly because, as the person in my agency 
responsible for processing some 95 de novo bank applications between 
1984 and 2008, I knew Tony had represented more of the formations than 
perhaps any other of the several fine attorneys who represent banks in 
North Carolina.  Surely he didn’t mean it. 
So after his speech, I spoke with him in the back of the room, and 
respectfully disagreed.  Now Professor Broome at UNC School of Law 
has asked that Tony and I exchange dueling essays over the matter.  We 
have agreed to do so, under the condition we remain friends.  I happily 
accept that. 
Let me begin by saying that, having heard his speech and read his 
remarks, I agree with most all of his premises and assertions—just not 
with his conclusion.  A banking law attorney since 1974, there is little 
about banking Tony doesn’t know or hasn’t been involved with.  There 
is no denying the facts.  Since Coastal Bank & Trust opened for business 
in 2009, no new bank has been chartered in North Carolina and this 
drought has been a nationwide phenomenon.  Between 2010 and 2013, 
there were no de novo formations in the U.S.  That run was finally broken 
by the Bank of Bird-In-Hand, Lancaster, PA.  Since then, only one bank, 
Primary Bank in Bedford, NH, has been opened, although another was 
recently approved by California to begin raising capital for a charter. 
By comparison with the formation rates in the early 1990s 
through 2006, these have been lean times indeed. 
* North Carolina Commissioner of Banks.  Commissioner Grace has served the State
of North Carolina for over 40 years at the Office of the Commissioner of Banks and as 
commissioner since 2012. 
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In past cycles, de novo bank formations were one of the earliest 
and best predictors of economic recoveries.  Serious downturns often led 
to industry consolidation, which led to market opportunities, which led to 
new bank formations, which replenished the industry, though admittedly 
not enough to completely turn the tide of industry-wide consolidation 
that’s been going on for decades.  In fact, one of the best times to start a 
bank was on the heels of a recession, while incumbent banks were still 
saddled with legacy assets that inhibited their ability to go after new 
business. 
So what’s different this time?  Many bankers and industry 
observers have blamed a “moratorium” on new bank insurance 
applications by the FDIC; I don’t think this is true.  There is little doubt 
the FDIC has tightened its standards for approval of applications on the 
heels of the Great Recession.  Given the number of bank failures, and the 
typical pressures and finger-pointing from Washington, that was 
predictable, even inevitable.  One can argue over whether the degree of 
tightening has been reasonable, but there has been no moratorium. 
Some argue that regulatory burden is the culprit, pointing to the 
Dodd-Frank Act as a major factor.  There is no question a growing thicket 
of new bank regulations, layered onto an already difficult tangle of old 
regulations and policies, has increased the industry’s overhead costs 
significantly.  It would be interesting to know empirically just how big 
that impact has been.  Although the regulatory burden varies from bank 
to bank, at the very least, it puts large banks at great advantage to small 
ones.  But I don’t think that’s the primary reason for the dearth of de 
novos either.  Not yet. 
What is much different from past cycles is the lack of economic 
drivers to form new banks.  Banks are formed for a number of different 
reasons, but at the risk of sounding like an unrepentant capitalist (guilty), 
profit potential is a major motivation and a reasonable expectation of the 
founders and investors of any new bank. 
We have experienced the greatest and most persistent economic 
downturn in our lifetimes.  Indeed, we still suffer from the lingering 
effects of that downturn, as well as fiscal and monetary policies that 
prolong many of those effects.  If not an L-shaped recovery, this is as 
close to one as we have experienced yet.  As a consequence, margin 
compression, coupled with the higher overhead costs associated with 
regulatory compliance, have changed the dynamics for new bank 
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formations, including necessary capital and time to break-even. 
Adding to the problem in varying degrees are investor and 
industry uncertainty over future regulatory actions and banking 
legislation, concerns about the economy, damage to the industry’s 
reputation, and the availability of so-called “scratch ‘n’ dent” banks, 
sometimes called zombie banks; not quite dead, but not quite able to fully 
recover.  In more normal recoveries, these banks were very often able to 
earn their way back to health as the economy healed.  In this cycle, those 
wanting to get into banking have often looked to acquire these banks as 
a cheaper entrée to the industry than starting a de novo bank. 
So, is Tony right?  With all respect, I think not, for the following 
reasons. 
II. RESILIENCY OF THE COMMUNITY BANK MODEL
First, we are again talking about de novo banks.  If you had tried 
to start a conversation with someone about forming a new bank just a 
couple of years ago, people would think you mad, and not without some 
justification.  Now, de novo bank formation is back in the marketplace of 
ideas and respectable thought, if maybe just a little on the edgy side. 
In 2013, the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis and the 
Conference of State Bank Supervisors, recognizing the importance of 
community banks and the disturbing rate of their consolidation that 
seemed to endanger the species, collaborated to sponsor a conference on 
“Community Banking in the 21st Century” at the St. Louis FRB.  First 
held in October of 2013 and now an annual event, this represents a 
concerted effort to foster academic research about community banks to 
find ways to enhance the viability of the model.  Each conference is the 
culmination of a year-long effort, informed through academic and FRB 
research papers, as well as input from bankers at town-hall meetings 
hosted by state Commissioners around the country.  Though not directly 
linked to de novo banking, this effort evidences the commitment of the 
Federal Reserve and state regulators to the community bank model, 
which has traditionally been the dominant form of de novo bank. 
The first meeting was strongly influenced by a paper prepared by 
Alton Gilbert, Andy Meyer and James Fuchs of the St. Louis Fed that 
took the unusual approach of studying community banks that thrived 
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during and despite the worst of the financial crisis.1  The community 
banks studied had less than $10 billion in total assets, and “thriving” was 
defined as maintaining a CAMELS rating of 1 throughout the years 2006 
through year-end 2011.2The unusual things about this study were the 
novel concept of learning from institutions that clearly did things right 
rather than from failures and the conclusions, including that size did not 
matter.3  A surprising number of very small banks did quite well.4 
So an empirical study would seem to imply that there is still a 
market for small banks, and therefore de novos are feasible.  Beyond that, 
this study and many others clearly demonstrate the importance of 
community banks to our economy, and especially to the communities 
they serve. 
III. SPRINGTIME FOR DE NOVOS?  REGULATORS AND INDUSTRY
EXPECTING A THAW IN THE ICE 
Next, in September of 2015 the FDIC and Conference of State 
Bank Supervisors put together a seminar on how to evaluate and process 
de novo charter and deposit insurance applications.  The impetus behind 
this initiative was a recognition that (1) there was an increasing likelihood 
that we would soon begin to see a resurgence of these applications, and 
(2) it had been so long since anyone had seen one, and it was important
to dust off the process and be prepared.5  I had the privilege of helping
instruct regulators from the FDIC, FRB, OCC, and over 30 states.  While
the consensus of the group was that no one was beating down their door
to start a bank, many were hearing some chatter and interest was expected
to pick up.
An American Banker article, reported in November of 2015 a 
perceived relaxation of standards for de novo bank insurance applications 
and efforts by the FDIC to clarify requirements.6  This suggests a more 
1. R. Alton Gilbert et al., The Future of Community Banks: Lessons from Banks That
Thrived During the Recent Financial Crisis, 95 FED. RES. BANK OF ST. LOUIS REV. 115 
(2013). 
2. Id. at 116.
3. Id. at 137–38.
4. Id. at 118–19.
5. See Ian McKendry, FDIC Gives Ground on De Novo Applications, AM. BANKER,
Nov. 25, 2014 (noting industry perception of FDIC guidance on de novo capital requirements 
as an indication of increased de novo applications in the near future). 
6. Ian McKendry & John Reosti, De Novo Drought May Finally Be About to End, AM.
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receptive attitude toward de novo insurance applications than we have 
sensed through most of the downturn and its immediate aftermath. 
Certainly if you read the American Banker or the Wall Street 
Journal, you can’t help but notice the increased level of interest in de 
novos, or at least the lack of them.  People tend to talk about things that 
interest them. 
It’s unlikely anyone would view the Bank of Bird-In-Hand as a 
turning point in the de novo cycle,7 but Primary Bank in New Hampshire 
does seem a bit more indicative of renewed interest in new bank 
formations,8 and the state of California has conditionally approved a 
charter for a new bank in Newport Beach, their first since 2008.9  Core 
Commercial Bank (Proposed) is being formed by Mark Simmons, who 
previously formed and then sold Commerce National Bank, also in 
Newport Beach.10  What’s particularly interesting about this proposal is 
the high level of competition in the target market; the proposed main 
office is directly across the street from the former home office of 
Commerce National, now a branch of the Umpqua Bank subsidiary of the 
$23 billion Umpqua Holdings . 
Simmons proposes to follow the same business model as he used 
in his previous bank, which he described to the American Banker as a 
“typical, traditional, old-fashioned business community bank.”11  My 
guess is that, in the old argument whether customers bank with banks or 
with people, Simmons would go with the latter.  It will be interesting to 
BANKER, Oct. 26, 2015. 
7. Given the highly unusual nature of Bank of Bird-in-Hand’s business model, it should
not be viewed as representative of the broader community bank industry.  Ryan Tracy, A 
Local Bank in Amish Country Flourishes Amid Dearth of Small Lenders, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 
29, 2015, 9:11 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/a-local-bank-in-amish-country-flourishes-
amid-dearth-of-small-lenders-1427677879.  It was chartered to serve a specific community—
the Amish—through business loans involving relatively small amounts of money.  Id. 
8. DIVISION OF RISK MGMT. SUPERVISION, FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., APPLICATION FOR
FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE RE: PRIMARY BANK (2015), 
https://www.fdic.gov/regulations/laws/bankdecisions/DepIns/primary_bank.pdf; Saabira 
Chaudhuri, New Hampshire Businessman Files to Set Up Rare New Bank, WALL ST. J., (Dec. 
15, 2014, 7:29 PM), http://www.wsj.com/ articles /new-hampshire-businessman-files-to-set-
up-rare-new-bank-1418689778. 
9. Core Commercial Bank (Proposed) Granted Conditional Approval by California
Department of Business Oversight, BUS. WIRE, (Nov. 23, 2015, 9:00 AM), 
http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20151123005281/en/Core-Commercial-Bank-
Proposed-Granted-Conditional-Approval. 
10. Andy Peters, Proposed Calif. De Novo Prepares to Enter Competitive Lending
Market, AM. BANKER, Nov. 25, 2015. 
11. Id.
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follow his progress raising the minimum $25 million capital required by 
the State Commissioner.  It will also be instructive to follow progress of 
the deposit insurance application through the FDIC. 
IV. NOTHING NEW UNDER THE SUN: THE CURRENT BANK FORMATION
CYCLE 
In past consolidation waves, the loss of banks, especially 
community banks, to mergers, has often left pockets of demand by both 
consumers and businesses who appreciated and then missed the level of 
personal attention and the community service and involvement of the 
acquired banks.  As a result, de novo banks would be formed to fill the 
vacuum.  This is, I think, equally true in this cycle.  And just as in these 
past cycles, consolidation is again displacing former bank directors and 
officers, many of whom still have a love of banking.  Some of these may 
well want to start new banks to fill the void. 
One piece of the dynamic that fueled some past de novo 
formations, touched on by Tony in his essay, is the desire to replicate the 
financial rewards experienced by investors in previous formations that 
culminated in highly lucrative sales of their banks.  As Tony correctly 
points out, the days of acquisitions of small banks at large multiples of 
book value have left the market for the time being, but I think they will 
return, given more normalized interest rates and a stronger economy. 
V. COOPERATIVE INNOVATION: FINTECH AND RECEPTIVENESS TO NEW
BANKING MODELS 
So what do we need to see for a true resurgence of de novo banks? 
1. A stronger economy.  This likely depends largely on a
more predictable, business-friendly attitude from
Washington.
2. A normalized monetary policy permitting market
forces to drive interest rates and the yield curve.
3. Less aggressive regulation, informed by a realistic
cost-benefit analysis of new laws and rules, especially on
the consumer side.
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4. Innovation—lots of innovation.
In the community banking model, relationships are still key, and 
that advantage still lives with the smaller, traditional community banks.  
However, all banks need to look at new ways of delivering old products 
and services and at market demands for entirely new products and 
services.  Bankers need only look to the communications industry in the 
past ten to fifteen years as an analog for banking and financial services.  
Not long ago, the (practical) cell phone was introduced.  Recently, the 
number of U.S. homes with landlines slipped below 50%.  Tried to find 
a phone booth lately?  There’s no app for that! 
Fintech and mobile applications are changing the face of the 
financial services industry, of which banking is the centerpiece.  While 
there has for some time been a lot of speculation about what banks of the 
future will look like, perhaps a hint can be found in that hotbed of banking 
innovation, Weir, Kansas (pop. 661).  While not a de novo formation, 
Citizens Bank of Weir, a tiny bank with $17 million in assets, is a poster 
child for bank innovation.12  Acquired in 2009 by Suresh Ramamurthi, 
this bank has been transformed into a revenue machine, leading the 
American Banker to name Ramamurthi “Innovator of the Year” for 
2015.13  While this essay hasn’t the room for a detailed description of 
how this was done, the key to the transformation has been Mr. 
Ramamurthi’s embrace and incorporation of fintech into the banking 
platform,14 generating ROE of nearly 21% in 2013 and almost 47% in 
2014. 
The secret sauce for all banks in the future, including small 
community banks and especially de novos, will be how they reimagine 
the banking industry, to retain the trust and loyalty of their customers that 
has traditionally been the linchpin of their success, while keeping up with 
the changing preferences and needs of those customers and those of new 
12. Marc Hochstein, Innovator of the Year: CBW Bank’s Suresh Ramamurthi, AM. 
BANKER, Dec. 17, 2015. 
13. Id.
14. See id.  For example, the bank’s technology is speeding up payment processing for
its clients to real-time money transfers.  Id.  Mr. Ramamurthi is also incorporating other 
company’s cutting-edge risk management technology into his bank’s product offerings.  Id. 
(“One such feature uses Internet-connected sensors in cars to vet debit card purchases at gas 
stations.”). 
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generations to come. 
Which brings me to an equally critical industry need – we all 
know that banks are special because of their role in the economy and 
because they are predicated on the public trust.  This is why they are 
highly regulated.  Regulators are the gatekeepers for that public trust and 
for safety and soundness of the industry.  It is not surprising then that 
regulators are possessed of a healthy skepticism and inquiring 
dispositions.  I think it fair to say though that what they have not been 
particularly noted for is imagination.  Thinking outside the box has not 
been their strength. 
To some extent, this is good.  In banking, we need a steady hand 
and, at times, someone to tap the brakes and take a cautious look at some 
of the racier ideas (and characters) driving the business.  However, ours 
is an ever more diverse, complex, and rapidly evolving economy, and it 
is not best served by regulators who reflexively impede much-needed 
change and innovation. 
In particular, with respect to de novo banks, I think it’s a mistake 
to try to hold new entries to the marketplace to a single, plain-vanilla, 
community bank model.  That model is still viable in some markets, but 
should not be the only acceptable mode of operation.  If there is only one 
acceptable model, why would we need more than one bank? 
North Carolina chartered, and the FDIC insured, Square 1 Bank 
in 2005.15  Though looked at skeptically by some, it served a valuable 
need for emerging businesses, especially in the biotech and high tech 
fields, but has since been acquired by a California bank.  It was very 
different from traditional banks, but highly successful.  It landed in North 
Carolina because we were willing to hear about and think through the 
proposed model. 
Similarly, Live Oak Bank, founded in Wilmington in 2008, has a 
highly innovative business model specializing in SBA lending to tightly 
focused lines of business.16  Despite being a fairly radical departure from 
15. DIVISION OF RISK MGMT. SUPERVISION, FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., APPLICATION FOR
FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE IN RE: SQUARE 1 BANK (2005), 
https://www.fdic.gov/regulations/laws/bankdecisions/depins/Square_1_Bank_Durham_NC_
7-1-2005.pdf.  Square 1 Bank was primarily focused on providing loans and banking services
to venture capital firms and venture-backed startup companies.  David Ranii, Durham’s 
Square 1 Bank to Be Acquired, THE NEWS & OBSERVER (Mar. 2, 2015, 5:57 PM),
http://www.newsobserver.com/news/business/article11949419.html.
16. Amy Feldman, Chip Mahan, First Internet Banker, Is Back With Tech-Enabled SBA
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traditional bank models, and operating in the most difficult of economic 
times, it has been extraordinarily successful, and is now the second 
biggest SBA lender in the nation. 
The common theme here is that both banks engage in very 
specialized lending to very specific types of businesses.  Very few banks, 
and no traditional community banks, are able to adequately and safely 
serve these businesses.  That’s the space where I think regulators need to 
be more thoughtful, more flexible, and more receptive if the banking 
industry is to evolve in ways that will accommodate a dynamic, fast-
changing economy.  Skeptical is good.  Unwillingness to adapt and 
obstructing important innovation is not.  We need to be partners with the 
industry in fostering safe, sound innovation. 
VI. CONCLUSION
I recognize the challenging headwinds facing de novo bank 
formations; many of those same headwinds are buffeting the entire 
banking industry.  But ours is a resilient industry that has already seen 
dramatic change.  When Lawyer Gaeta and I first became involved with 
banking in 1974, computers were the new thing, and most bank 
applications were just beginning to be automated.  There were still some 
Boston Ledgers in use.17  Consumers clung to their savings passbooks 
and still received their cancelled checks at the end of each month.  Many 
bookkeeping departments still posted accounts on ledger cards with 100-
key Burroughs adding machines, some of them hand-cranked. 
Regulation Q and Glass-Steagall were alive and well, and 3-6-3 banking 
was just beginning to fade.18  Sadly, bad hairdos, leisure suits, clunky 
shoes, and bellbottoms lingered on awhile longer. 
Being in the middle of it all, it was hard to see what changes 
would come, but come they did, and the industry coped.  Banking is the 
Lender Live Oak Bank, FORBES (Nov. 17, 2015, 6:00 AM), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/amyfeldman/2015/11/17/chip-mahan-first-internet-banker-is-
back-with-tech-enabled-sba-lender-live-oak-bank/. 
17. For younger readers, Boston Ledgers were manual posting systems where each
transaction of the bank was entered by hand in a single ledger, which was then used to update 
the bank’s general ledger. 
18. Regulation Q limited interest rates that could be offered to depositors, the Glass-
Steagall Act separated commercial and investment banking, and 3-6-3 refers to the 3% net 
interest margins banks earned from loans earning on average 6% funded by deposits on which 
an average interest of 3% was paid. 
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lifeblood of our local and national economies, and is much too important 
not to evolve and continue to play a central role.  As “laboratories for 
experimentation” and as engines for community growth, I think de novo 
state banks will play an important role in that evolution.  We’re just 
beginning to see the stirrings of that renewal. 
